

# NOTAS HISTÓRICAS Y GEOGRÁFICAS

## **Artículos**

## **HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF HERMENEUTIC LOGIC**

### **HISTORIA DEL DESARROLLO DE LA LÓGICA HERMENÉUTICA**

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Recibido el 02 de agosto de 2020

Aceptado el 09 de diciembre de 2020

### Abstract

Hermeneutic logic as a kind of informal logic for understanding and interpretation is considered in the context of Western European history of philosophy, in particular philosophical hermeneutics. There is an influence on logical forms of ontological contexts and intralinguistic forms, rationalization of meaning through sign systems in the history of hermeneutic logic. The determinant is historical induction, the conclusions of which are appropriate for the knowledge of objective and subjective histories. Logical forms of judgments and inferences are constructed not in the genus-species relation, but in the relation of the part and the whole, which correlates with the algorithm of dialectics of the hermeneutic circle. Hermeneutic logic, defined on the basis of historical induction, appears as the logic of humanitarian cognition, that forms a culture of understanding and interpretation techniques.

**Keywords:** history, hermeneutic logic, historical induction, logic of humanitarian cognition.

### Resumen

La lógica hermenéutica como una especie de lógica informal para la comprensión y la interpretación se considera en el contexto de la historia de la filosofía de Europa occidental, en particular, la hermenéutica filosófica. La historia de la lógica hermenéutica revela la influencia en las formas lógicas de los contextos ontológicos y las formas intralingüísticas, la racionalización del significado a través de los sistemas de signos. El determinante es la inducción histórica, cuyas conclusiones son adecuadas para el conocimiento de historias objetivas y subjetivas. Las formas lógicas de juicios e inferencias no se construyen a base de la relación del género y la especie, sino a base de la relación de la parte y el todo, que se correlaciona con el algoritmo de dialéctica del círculo hermenéutico. La lógica hermenéutica, definida a base de la inducción histórica, surge como la lógica de la cognición humanitaria, que forma una cultura de comprensión y técnicas de interpretación.

**Palabras Clave:** historia, lógica hermenéutica, inducción histórica, lógica del conocimiento humanitario.

**Para citar este artículo:**

Yurkevych, Olena M.; Pavlenko, Zhanna O. y Trofymenko, Volodymyr A. History of the development of hermeneutic logic. Revista Notas Históricas y Geográficas, número 26 Enero-Junio 2021. pp. 01-28.

## 1. INTRODUCCIÓN

The history of logical knowledge is described in the scientific literature mainly as the history of traditional and classical formal logic. In the second half of the XX century, thanks to the work of American and European scientists, a new direction was defined, which was called *informal logic*, where everyday considerations were studied. Eventually, informal logic began to be associated with cognition in the humanities. In line with informal logic, a theory of argumentation developed that differed from classical proof. Later it became clear that informal logic also correlates with philosophical hermeneutics, which adds to the methodology of humanitarian cognition a theoretical generalization of reflection of understanding and interpretation techniques. «Hermeneutics, taken as a historical movement, is informed by a longer history that dates back to antiquity. The modern history of hermeneutics originates with figures in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought, especially Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey. Contemporary hermeneutics is shaped, in turn, especially by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, as well as by Paul Ricoeur and others (see Palmer 1969, Grondin 1994, L. Schmidt 2006, Zimmerman 2015)»<sup>1</sup>. But since separation of the sciences of nature and the sciences of spirit in Western European philosophy of the XIX century by Wilhelm Dilthey is still relevant the question of the peculiarities of *the logic of humanitarian cognition*, which become clear while revealing *the history of hermeneutics*. It is known that the logic of humanitarian cognition is less strict than the logic of natural science, in particular with regard to the implementation of the principles of unambiguity and provability. In this sense, the logical means of establishment and analysis of humanities show a certain similarity to the logic of practical thinking.

The term "*hermeneutic logic*" as the logic of understanding and interpretation denotes the structural organization of interpretation, the correlation between understanding and interpretation, as well as the procedural order of hermeneutic practice.

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<sup>1</sup> Hermeneutics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1995, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/#HermHistMove> (accessed February 16, 2021).

Understanding emerges as a result as a form of a certain integrity. An example of hermeneutic practice can be the practice of an interpreter, which has a certain sequence of actions: listening to a foreign text, translation and transmission of this text to the recipient in his native language, where the translated text is a holistic semantic result of interpretation of the original text. Also, its own logic has the interpretation of historical and other texts, the culture of reading, which is inconceivable without understanding and interpretation as a result of processing, ordering of individual fragments of the text. Any procedure of meaning formation, such as reading, interaction, communication, dialogue, etc., requires a certain logical ordering. Conversely, the lack of ordering of such actions leads to their futility. That is, "*the semantic order*" is carried out logically in the process of mental activity. In this sense, the procedural logic of the hermeneutic act can be considered as a kind of logic of practical action. Its peculiarity is that the "*external*" order of action must correlate with the "*internal*" logic of understanding and interpretation. In other words, the methods of organizing the search for meaning must correspond to the methodology of meaning formation. The study of the history of hermeneutics in the Western European philosophical tradition made it possible to define hermeneutic logic as an independent subject<sup>2</sup>.

## 2. AT THE SOURCES OF HERMENEUTIC LOGIC (ARISTOTLE'S TREATISE "ON INTERPRETATION")

We find the first sources of hermeneutic logic in ancient Greek philosophy. In particular, the well-founded idea of the relationship between understanding and logic of utterances is contained in Aristotle's famous work "*On Interpretation*", which also has a second name "*Hermeneutics*"<sup>3</sup>. This treatise of Aristotle does not belong to the purely hermeneutic in subject

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<sup>2</sup> Elena Nykolaevna Yurkevych, «Hermenevtycheskaia lohyka: ot fylosofskoho obosnovaniya k samostoiatelnoi dystsyplyne», «Filosofski perypetii. Visnyk KhNU im. V. N. Karazina, № 53|2001; seriia: filosofii» (2001). 163-169; Olena Mykolaivna Yurkevych, *Hermenevtychna lohika: monohrafiia*, Riga, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2018, <http://www.lap-publishing.com/catalog/details/store/gb/book/978-613-9-84284-1/hermenevtychna-lohika?search=iurkevych%20o.m.%20hermenevtychna%20lohika> (accessed February 16, 2021).

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel, «Ob istolkovanii», v soch. v 4-h t., t. 2 (Moskva: Myisl, 1978), 97-116.

matter, but the logical theory of utterances in it is subject to the goal of achieving a semantic result by the correct processing and giving logical meaning to linguistic expressions. In other words, knowledge of logical form is necessary in the presence of semantic strategy, teleology of meaning and logic (analytics in general) in the usual sense for us acts as an organ of scientific knowledge.

Under such conditions, the text of the treatise "On Interpretation" is read with special emphasis. The problem of interpretation in it depends on the logical and grammatical possibilities of expression. Adequacy of understanding is from the correctness of the grammatical structure of language and the logical truth of statements (correctness of logical form). That is, Aristotle adheres to the rational principle: one can understand only what is properly formed and true. Conversely, incorrect grammatical forms and erroneous judgments do not contribute to the understanding of the utterance. Thus, Aristotle outlines the logical and grammatical parameters ascending to understanding.

According to Aristotle, individual words as units of language are neutral to understand as long as they are out of context (not part of the utterance). They are logically neutral (neither true nor false), because it is impossible to establish a logical meaning. The ability to establish a logical value depends on the ontological state of the subject. For example, writes Aristotle, the names "apple" or "goat-deer" mean something, but it is unknown whether these objects really exist. If we hear a word out of context, we can say that it is "something", however, this is not enough because then arise questions: how to understand it? and for what was it said? Thus, already within the logical theory of statements there are grounds for the formation of a contextual approach to the semantic goal, which will later become one of the determinants in philosophical hermeneutics.

Following the text of Aristotle, we can be sure that the *time* factor plays a significant role in establishing the criteria of interpretation. The understanding of utterances is conditioned by the temporal boundary in the form of the present tense verb as ascending in relation to other temporal

forms of verbs. Aristotle argues that with the change of temporal forms of verbs begins language, some reasoning that can be understood. Much later, this idea was developed by Martin Heidegger in "Being and Time"<sup>4</sup>, where he argued that the determining factor in interpretation from the point of view of ontology is precisely the time through which voiced being can continue and change under the influence of different contexts. In Aristotle's treatise, the term is understood as a verbal form of judgment. Expression is the primary and authentic internal form (thought) of the way of interpretation (transmission with transformation) of meaning. Expression as the main object of Aristotle's research appears as a way of interpretation due to the inseparable connection of ontological content and logical form. From this point of view, the title of the treatise "On Interpretation" (or "Hermeneutics") no longer seems to be accidental, but receives its own explanation.

In the linguistic form of expression, Aristotle distinguishes between speaking and utterance. Speaking is some proclamation in which the meaning is not defined, is vague. In this case, the proclamation is neutral to understand because it does not have the correct logical and grammatical form. That is, you can declare anything, but will it make sense? Utterance, on the contrary, is organized grammatically and logically correctly. Therefore, the utterance can be understood.

In medieval hermeneutics, Aristotle's logical works were used to prove the existence of God and to interpret the biblical text. With the penetration of Christian ideas into the ancient Greek world, there is a need to translate the text of the Bible into Greek. During this period, a semiotic theory of the relationship between sign and meaning is formed, which has developed and become an effective methodology for modern logical analysis, in particular, the semantic interpretation of humanities.

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<sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Bytie i vremya*, per. s nem., izd. 2-e, ispr. (Sankt-Peterburg: «Nauka», 2002).

### 3. THEORY OF SIGNS BL. AUGUSTINE AND BIBLICAL EXEGESIS

The development of logical-semiotic methods was carried out in connection with the problems of biblical exegesis, especially with regard to the understanding and interpretation of the text of the Bible. After the ancient Greek philological methods for the interpretation of historical and artistic texts in the Western European Middle Ages, the question of the adequacy of understanding of religious texts. The condition for this is faith, the correspondence of the spiritual state of the translator to the sacred text of the translation. The Christian faith of the translator determines the spiritual nature of the meaning of the religious translated text. The translator's responsibility becomes the highest because it is a responsibility before God. Therefore, the right for interpretation and translation is strictly limited. There are preconditions for the "official interpretation", which is enshrined in dogmatic hermeneutics, which are theological and legal hermeneutics. Criteria and methods of interpretation are concretized and become more stringent.

If the mythological example of the hermeneutician was Hermes, on whose behalf the term "hermeneutics" arose, then the Christian model is Jesus Christ. Accordingly, the first Hermeneutic theologian in Christian history was St. Paul. At the beginning of our era, the first theorists appeared to interpret and teach methods of interpreting sacred texts. Origen, who is considered the first Christian theologian, in the new historical conditions was able to preserve some features of the Greek tradition. In particular, he used an allegorical method of explaining religious texts characteristic of the late antique period in relation to the church's explanation of Christian sacred texts. This method became decisive for the Alexandrian school, which offered an allegorical interpretation of the Bible. However, the alternative method was adopted by the School of Pergamum, which advocated a word-to-word, literal interpretation. Allegory appears as "allegorical exegesis", a method of understanding through the comparison of fragments of the biblical text. Allegory provided a direct (literal) meaning and figurative (spiritual).

Origen used the Platonic distinction of body, soul and spirit to convey the three-level



construction of Scripture: figural, moral and anagogic (target). In Christian Doctrine, Augustine also used an allegorical (figurative) interpretation through the prism of a triad of faith, hope, and love. Later in Christian exegesis, the interpretation of sacred texts was carried out by: a) cross-reading the Bible (understanding the Old Testament in comparison with the New Testament and vice versa); b) reflexive reading (biblical texts were interpreted with the help of Christian dogmas); c) literal comparison (using a digital guide). Thus, the sacred text of the Bible took the form of a multi-layered symbol that reveals its meaning through comparable judgments (analogies).

The beginning of *the structural-symbolic approach (semiotics)* is found in the work of Aurelius Augustine (Blessed) "Christian Science, or the Fundamentals of St. Hermeneutics and Church Eloquence"<sup>5</sup>. Under hermeneutics he understood the theory (rules) and practice (rhetoric) of understanding and interpretation of biblical texts. The rules allow us to find the true meaning of sacred texts. That is, the meaning is established in a certain sequence of intellectual actions in the state of religious faith of the interpreter, which determines the spiritual meaning of understanding the sacred text of the Bible.

For Augustine, the word is a divine *sign*. Spiritual meaning forms a person's moral system with the help of language signs. Thus, in the process of studying the problems of interpretation of the Bible, Augustine formulates the task of the science of *signs and sign systems* in relation to their possibilities of expression. The purpose of interpretation is to establish the meaning relative to a particular sign or sign complex. Thus the foundations of semantics, the theory of *semantic interpretation* are formed. In "Christian Science" Augustine recognizes the existence of enlightenment, epiphany as a "direct" understanding. But the main thing for him was to study the possibilities of rationalization of understanding, intelligent presentation of the logical and spiritual aspects of meaning.

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<sup>5</sup> Blazhenyiy Avgustin, Hristianskaya nauka, ili Osnovaniya Sv. germenetiki i tserkovnogo krasnorechiya (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd-vo «Bibliopolis», 2007), 512.

According to Augustine, objects of the objective world (tree, animal, stone) may or may not be signs. And the signs of natural language are not objects of the objective world. Only a conditional linguistic sign can be considered an object that has physical qualities (because it is materialized). But in the literal sense, a sign is an abstract object.

A sign is something that is used to denote objects. While recognizing objects, it is necessary to look for their own essence in them, and not what they can still mean. And while recognizing the signs, on the contrary, it is necessary to look not for what they are in themselves, but for what they signify. A sign is a special object that affects human feelings. For example, traces left by an animal that we can imagine, although we saw only its traces, and so on.

Signs are divided into natural and artificial (*data*). Natural signs in themselves, of course, give rise to the concept of another thing. For example, smoke is a sign of fire regardless of human perception. Such signs are known by experience. Through conditional (artificial) signs, living beings by mutual consent express personal emotional experiences, feelings and thoughts. Such signs are created by people and acquire substantive and semantic significance in understanding and interpreting the text of the Bible. Animals also have their own sign system for communication (for example, a dove "calls" a dove).

Human signs are divided into visual and auditory, and only a small number of them relate to other senses. A person can give a sign with his hand (point) or nod his head, or give a sign only by moving his eyes. Actors use bodily signs in pantomime. Military flags are also visual signs. As an example of tactile signs, Augustine cites the commemoration of Christ: touching his clothes and subsequent healing. In this case, touch is a sign of healing. Hence the rite of tasting the body and blood of Christ as symbols of the repetition of this commemoration.

The largest number of characters is represented in words. The words explain the meaning

that corresponds to the sign. Understanding is possible through the correspondence of sign and meaning, not sign and word. Therefore, it is impossible to express words proper with the help of signs (beyond their meaning). In turn, words are embodied in letters. Letters are signs of words that are perceived by sight.

Multilingualism and differences in writing (literature) are explained by analogy with the biblical story of the Tower of Babel. Multilingualism creates problems with people's understanding, which complicates their lives. This complication is interpreted as a punishment for pride when a person wanted to be on an equal footing with God. Thus, the fact of the diversity of linguistic sign systems has a spiritual meaning. But if multilingualism in Christian culture is seen by Augustine as a punishment, the interpretation of the Bible is seen as a way to reunite and save mankind. That is why, for the salvation of mankind, the Bible began to be translated into various natural languages.

Medieval hermeneutics connects spirit and mind with a single issue. This combination forms the spiritual component of humanitarian knowledge, its methodology, in which, in particular, hermeneutics is given considerable importance. The semantic system appears as a method of rationalizing religious texts in their perception, understanding and interpretation.

Augustine believed that the problem of understanding was created by God to test human faith. Truth that has been discovered by overcoming the difficulties of understanding is especially valuable to man. The spiritual aspect of understanding presupposes the existence of piety as a condition for correct understanding. Piety also means the inconsistency of the mind of the spirit (meaning) of Scripture.

Overcoming obstacles to understanding and updating the meaning of repeated reading of the Bible text means that there are different degrees of convergence to the meaning of the biblical text.

This could be called the "*depth*" of *understanding*. Augustine attributed the understanding of the Bible to the third stage of human spiritual development, which is the acquisition of moral knowledge.

Logic and mathematics are of great importance to Augustine. Logic should not be an end in itself. In addition, there may be logical inferences, but inadequate in content. In particular, this is possible with a wrong foundation. The use of false statements in sacred texts can only be to refute them. For example, the judgment "Christ is not risen" is wrong. But in the Apostle (Cor. XV, 14) this false statement is used to refute the conclusion "If there is no resurrection from the dead, then Christ is not risen. But Christ is risen; therefore, there is a resurrection"<sup>6</sup>. In this case, the logical meaning of truth or falsehood depends entirely on faith. The truth of the judgment "Christ is risen" and the falsity of the judgment "Christ is not risen" are not related to their epistemological status, the establishment of probability. Augustine explains this by saying that logical correctness is a given to man, an objective characteristic of human intelligence. Logical laws and rules are not created by people, but only revealed in the process of self-knowledge. Therefore, truths conditioned by faith are, so to speak, truths that are determined intuitively, in connection with the inner nature, outside of analytics.

In addition, it may be that the inference is correct in form, and the content of the opinion will be wrong. For example, the correct conclusion is "If a snail is an animal, then it can speak. But the snail cannot speak. So he is not an animal. " By logical form it is the modus tollens of the conditional-categorical syllogism:  $(A \rightarrow B, \neg B) \supset \neg A$ . There may be a case when a false conclusion is drawn on the basis of true statements. For example: "If N. is fair, then he is good. N. is not fair. So he's not good". This is an incorrectly constructed conditional-categorical syllogism, in which the order of negation is violated: the basis is denied first, and then the consequence.

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<sup>6</sup> Blazhenyiy Avgustin, Hristianskaya nauka, ili Osnovaniya Sv. germeneytiki i tserkovnogo krasnorechiya (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd-vo «Bibliopolis», 2007), 140-141.

The correct construction of this syllogism requires the reverse order of actions: first the consequence must be denied and then the basis. In this example, it is the logic that is wrong, not the content. Thus, knowledge of the rules of logic (the way of connecting thoughts) and truth is not the same thing.

Among the many logical methods relevant to understanding and interpreting the dark places of Holy Scriptures is *the method of analogy (traduction)*. If the words are used figuratively, it is necessary to use the Analogies of Faith (regula fidei), based on the dogmas of the Church. If, after using the Analogy of Faith, the dark place remains unclear again, it is necessary to analyze the context, it means to establish the probable meaning by reconstructing the relationships in the relationship of the subject, creating a logical chain of values.

Thus, in the process of development of semantics, through the liberation of the mind from superstitions about meanings in the process of interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, a Christian culture of translation was formed. This culture required, above all, knowledge of language, logic and mathematics. Understanding becomes an act of spiritual Christian freedom as spiritual growth.

From the XI century. after the discovery of texts on Roman law, legal hermeneutics begins to form. It developed as a dogmatic hermeneutics by analogy with the theological, based on Christian canons. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was a well-known systematizer of legal hermeneutics. Along with the general grammatical, historical and logical Grotius distinguishes special types of legal interpretation - technical (due to the specifics of specific legislation) and recommendatory (for practical use by professional lawyers).

Since the XVI century in contrast to the dogmatic, there is a need for a new Protestant interpretation of Holy Scriptures. In the days of Martin Luther, a set of methods of linguistics, logic, and poetics continued to be used in the reconstruction of meaning.

A new approach is formed based on the ratio of *whole and part*, which provides individual and general meanings.

Over time, the text of the Bible appears as a spiritual symbol and a model of the most difficult to interpret the text as a complex of sign systems, in which there are grammatical and logical structures that form the semantic meaning. At the same time, this most complex text is a record for the number of translations into different languages.

Matthias Flacius Illyricus in his major work, *Clavis scripturae sacrae* (The Key to the Interpretation of Scripture, 1567), continued the development of biblical hermeneutics (exegesis). He formulated new *hermeneutic principles* that brought to a new level of knowledge about interpretation.

The first of these was *the principle of contextual interpretation*, which has been known since the time of Augustine the Blessed, but has been clarified and finally approved by Flacius. The contextual approach contributed to a clearer distinction between the basic logical and semiotic concepts of "meaning" and "sense".

One of the hermeneutic principles was the principle of teleological direction, based on *the relationship of part to whole*. He gave impetus to the formation of the concept of hermeneutic circle, which will be one of the main modeling concepts for hermeneutic theory and practice. Thus, Flacius laid the foundations of the theory of meaning and expressed the main requirement of hermeneutics - to take into account the relationship of part to whole, interpreted expression to context. In other words, it is necessary to move from the sign - to the meaning, from the meaning - to the meaning, from the parts - to the whole. It is necessary to take into account the intention of the author of the text. An important provision of Flacius' theory was also the distinction between understanding and interpretation. Understanding was interpreted as a goal, and interpretation as a method. At the same time, interpretation is a necessary degree of understanding.

Due to the contextual approach and taking into account the intentions of the authors, the Scriptures were later treated not only from the standpoint of theological hermeneutics, but also as a historical and literary work. Thus, with the development of hermeneutics, logical-semiotic theory, analogies spread among the humanities.

#### 4. HISTORICAL INDUCTION OF I. HLADENIUS

In the history of hermeneutics, two teachings on the logic of historical cognition have acquired special significance: the historical induction of Hladenius (the logic of objective history) and the psychological interpretation of W. Dilthey (the logic of individual life history).

The formation of *the logic of historical cognition* of Hladenius<sup>7</sup> was influenced by the teachings of Wolf, who linked the development of logic with the philosophical justification of the ontological premises of thought. The idea of creating a special logic of historical cognition was caused by the justification of historical cognition, which in the eighteenth century was considered descriptive, non-theoretical and that does not reflect any patterns. The logical substantiation of the historical subject allowed to "raise" it to the level of scientific discipline.

In researching the possibilities of analyzing a historical object, Hladenius concludes that the inductive method is used in historical interpretation. The difference between the use of induction on a historical object and induction on a natural science subject is that this method works in relation to the part and the whole, and not to the genus and the species. It is called "*historical induction*". In this case, the transition from part to whole occurs by highlighting extraordinary (historically significant) events while ignoring most possible circumstances.

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<sup>7</sup> A thorough analysis of the logic of historical cognition of Hladenius is found in the works: Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, «Pervyy opyt logiki istoricheskikh nauk (K istorii ratsionalizma XVIII veka)», «Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii». (1915). 378-438; Aleksandr Sergeevich Lappo-Danilevskiy, Metodologiya istorii: v 2-h t., t. 1 (Moskva: Rossiyskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya (ROSSPEN), 2010).

This is due to the specifics of the historical object, which is not homogeneous and is presented in thinking as an empirical set in contrast to the purely mathematical set on which traditional and classical logic are built.

In this regard, the unit volume of the concept corresponding to the historical object is of special importance. Empirical judgments based on empirical experience are the result of the perception of individual cases. At the same time, they are given "general historical significance", they appear as "samples". Such empirical judgments are a kind of general judgments such as loci communes. Imaginary empirical sets, as opposed to purely mathematical ones, are created by means of an imaginary connection between individuals. Due to this connection, the elements of the empirical set are in a certain dependence on each other and form a special "space of the historical text". The heterogeneity of the empirical set is that some elements ("samples") have historically known proper names (such as Napoleon, the Knight Ivanhoe, etc.), but most individuals remain anonymous as members of the indefinite set (people). In the logic of historical cognition, "samples" are representatives of an indefinite set, but at the same time they do not belong to it on general grounds, but acquire special value.

Based on this, Hladius distinguishes three types of terms: singular, general and indefinite in volume. The logical features of these terms affect the features of three types of judgments, among which he distinguishes between single, general and judgments with an indefinite subject. The nature of the conclusion in the inferences obtained by induction also changes. The conclusion can be made by identifying the features of the "sample" with the features of the indefinite set. The apparent relationship between the individual elements of the indefinite set, as well as between the features of the "sample" and the indefinite set, determines the probable nature of the conclusion, which provides for possible exceptions. The conclusions of the historical induction of Hladius resemble modern statistical induction, in which there is a population and a sample, as well as the transfer of features of the selected sample to the studied class of objects, followed by a probable



conclusion. Such a course of thought is characteristic of practical thinking when working with empirical classes. Historical contexts are of special importance for historical induction.

##### 5. THE LOGIC OF SUBJECTIVE HISTORY IN W. DILTHEY

In the teachings of W. Dilthey a special place is occupied by the concept of logical forms based on the philosophy of life. The emergence of this concept was preceded by certain philosophical ideas that developed during this historical period in Europe. Dilthey's contemporary G. Misch<sup>8</sup> believed that the path to logic corresponds to the intention of the philosophy of life. With this thesis, Misch pointed to the alienation that emerged between logic and philosophy in general in the non-classical era and attempted to remove such alienation. On the one hand, logic has long struggled with psychologism, striving for the "purity" of its subject. Logic acquired such "purity" in its classics (mathematical logic). On the other hand, classical logic acquired its methodological significance precisely in relation to the natural sciences, while the sciences of the spirit were left out, and scientists often noted their inconsistency with strict logical standards. The discovery of the subject of irrationalism in relation to the mental life of man in alienation to strict logic led to an unjustified denial of the rationalization of the human world. Under the influence of the critique of rationalism, misconceptions arose in scientific circles about the ineffectiveness of logic in relation to objects of the spirit, and, as O. Bolnov<sup>9</sup> writes, these erroneous prejudices about logic already threatened to become permanent stereotypes in philosophy. Therefore, to avoid these extremes, which put a "barrier" in the knowledge of the subjects of the spirit, German philosophers, followers of the philosophy of life began to develop "*the logic of life*" to analyze the mental world.

The problem of the relationship between logic and life was posed by Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey formulated the problem of the relationship between life and conceptual thinking, and hence

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<sup>8</sup> Georg Misch, *Der Aufbau der Logik auf dem Boden der Philosophie des Lebens: Göttinger Vorlesungen über Logik und Einleitung in die Theorie des Wissens* (Freiburg: Alber, 1994).

<sup>9</sup> Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Studien zur Hermeneutik, band II: Zur hermeneutischen Logik von Georg Misch und Hans Lipps* (Freiburg [Breisgau]; München: Alber, 1983).

the question of the correlation of understanding and life. In this regard, Henri Bergson also pointed to "moving (or flowing) concepts" that represented the phenomenon of life. Thus, the fact that the main category of irrationalism, the category of life, was not considered decisive, arose as a logical problem.

W. Dilthey's students were Georg Mish, Herman Noll and Eduard Spranger. Mish prepared for publication the fifth and sixth volumes of "Gesammelten Schriften" ("Collections of Works") by W. Dilthey<sup>10</sup>, his works - "Die Idee der Lebensphilosophie in der Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften" ("The idea of philosophy of life in the theory of spirit sciences"), "Life philosophy and phenomenology. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Dilteyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl" ("Philosophy of Life and Phenomenology. Dilthey's discussion with Heidegger and Husserl"), lectures entitled "Logik und Einleitung in die Theorie des Wissens" ("Logic and Knowledge"), which he read during his teaching career in Göttingen. Wilhelm Dilthey's followers and students united around Dilthey's ideas, and Otto Bolnov called this union "Dilthey's school."

In the 1920s and 1930s, the first substantiations of hermeneutic logic were made in Germany in the works of G. Misch, G. Lipps, O. Bolnov, F. Roddy, G. Noll, J. Koenig, and others. One of the key works on this topic were the books by G. Lipps "Introduction to Hermeneutic Logic" (1938) and "Formal and Hermeneutic Logic"<sup>11</sup>. Georg Mish<sup>12</sup> developed the concept of hermeneutic logic based on the identification of the concepts of "life" and "articulation". Life due to discursive forms of personal representation appears as a category of logic and hermeneutics at the same time. The main logical forms of thought (concepts, judgments and inferences) G. Misch considered as "inventory of understanding". He called them morphological forms of understanding,

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<sup>10</sup> Vilgelm Diltey, «Vozniknovenie germeneytiki» v «Sobranie sochineniy v 6 t., t. 4: Germeneytika i teoriya literaturyi» (Moskva: Dom intellektualnoy knigi, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> Hans Lipps, «Formale und hermeneutische Logik» in «Seminar: Philosophische Hermeneutik. Herausgegeben von Hans-Georg Gadamer und Gottfried Boehm» (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 286–315.

<sup>12</sup> Georg Misch. Der Aufbau der Logik auf dem Boden der Philosophie des Lebens: Göttinger Vorlesungen über Logik und Einleitung in die Theorie des Wissens (Freiburg: Alber, 1994).

it means understanding appears as *a morphology of logical forms*. However, traditional and classical formal logic for the sciences of the spirit is limited if we consider this on the example of hypothetical judgments. This can be seen in cases where these forms take on different meanings in the expression of preference, advice, related natural phenomena, or axioms of following. If the level of abstraction increases, the standard of living decreases, and vice versa. By the way, we see the same pattern in the ratio of intentional and extensional components of the conceptual form of thought. In addition, logical functions are also present in the connections between life and thought. These connections are due to statements. Therefore, Mish emphasizes the evolutionary role of speech in its various possibilities. The "place of the logical" in life is the judgment that is expressed. Thus, Mish explains the idea of W. Dilthey that the world of human experiences becomes clear to him if he is embodied in expression.

Subjective experiences began to be judged not by the logical meanings of truth or falsehood, but by the meaning of truth or untruth. The logic of understanding individual life has the form of induction with certain features. This induction is based on the interpretation of individual experiences as facts of subjective experience, which are correlated by analogy and are the basis for the transition to a holistic understanding of the inner world of man. As in Hladenius, Dilthey induction is based on the relationship of part and whole, not genus and species. At the time of transition from part to whole there is a so-called "meteorological leap", known in modern non-classical logic. This "meteorological leap" is a nonlinear transition from the foundations to the conclusion, due to the irrational nature of the unconscious, which was defined by Dilthey as a "human remnant" that affects the entire course of the history of the spirit. The probable nature of the conclusion is due to the subjective probability of individual experience.

J. Koenig, continuing this direction, develops so-called analytical hermeneutics, focusing on the linguistic aspects of perception. On the basis of these studies, epistemological concepts were

also rethought, and hermeneutics began to be considered as an alternative to the traditional theory of cognition, epistemology and analytical philosophy of language<sup>13</sup>. Later, Paul Reeker<sup>14</sup>, in Freud's interpretation, considered the problem of "the place of origin of meaning," pointing to the sublimation and the emergence of symbolic pictures of life. Thus, meaning appears in life, and what is called the futility of life is not formless chaos, as naive irrationalists believe.

## 6. F. SCHLEIERMACHER: TECHNIQUE (LOGIC) OF RECONSTRUCTION OF MEANING

The introduction of the theoretical concept of *the hermeneutic circle* is attributed to Friedrich Schleiermacher<sup>15</sup>, who characterized this abstract figure as an "*imaginary circle*". The hermeneutic circle outlines the path of thought in *the logic (technique) of its reconstruction of the author's idea*. It means the conditional limit of the semantic relation that the interpreter creates in the direction of the imaginary author. In the history of European hermeneutics, the concept of "hermeneutic circle" performs a number of important functions, such as: the transfer of the relationship between subject and object, individual components of understanding, outlines the perspective of understanding, infinity (or relative finiteness) of understanding, its logic (order formation of different levels of understanding), etc.

*The reconstructive approach*, based on the use of the logic of the hermeneutic circle, becomes one of the most important, very fruitful in theoretical terms precisely because of Schleiermacher's philosophy. The hermeneutic circle rationally limits the interpreter's empathy to the author, makes it possible to determine the culture of feeling. *The dialectic of movement from part to whole* makes it possible to determine the direction of sensory movement.

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<sup>13</sup> Maja Soboleva, «Hermeneutical Logics» and «Analytical Hermeneutics» as a New Turn in Philosophical Hermeneutics, Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy (2018), <https://philpapers.org/rec/SOBHLA>.

<sup>14</sup> Pol Rikyor, *Konflikt interpretatsiy. Ocherki o germenevtike* (Moskva: «Academia-Tsentr», 1995).

<sup>15</sup> Fridrih Shleyermaher, *Germeneytika* (Sankt-Peterburg: «Evropeyskiy Dom», 2004).

If the interpreter seeks to understand the author better than he understood himself, and this understanding is rational (makes sense) and is given by the poetic model of the text, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the interpreter is in a similar "poetic mood" ("feelings"), the correspondence of which to the author was a prerequisite for the conformity of thoughts and the preservation of the poetic nature of the interpreted meaning. *The congeniality* of the author and the interpreter becomes an analogue of logical equivalences in formal logic, which give rise to logical axiomatics and are a form of logical laws. In essence, congeniality appears as a value equality. The presence of the general nature of understanding determines the correspondence of meanings in the conceptual forms of the original and the interpretive text.

Just as the human mind can illuminate many objects without being aware of its bases, so the human consciousness does not realize it at all. Therefore, it is the genesis and basis of the existence of consciousness and reason become objects of faith, and faith becomes relevant as a feeling that is a person's experience of its limits. In Schleiermacher's reasoning, faith is the limit of a rational way of understanding. Since faith inspires and is inspired by poetic forms, such processes can take place both in the theological interpretation of sacred texts and in the understanding and interpretation of works of art. Such features of understanding with the use of poetic thinking characterize the attitude to the humanities, which are objects of culture and, accordingly, require a certain *culture of understanding*. The approaches of W. Dilthey and F. Schleiermacher become a theoretical prerequisite for the future ontological hermeneutics of M. Heidegger. He continues to develop the concept of the hermeneutic circle of H.-G. Gadamer<sup>16</sup>, who is considered the ancestor of philosophical hermeneutics. The hermeneutic circle becomes the principle of understanding, which represents the dialectic of part and whole.

The problem of understanding extends the methodology of scientific cognition. There is a concept of "*logical understanding*" (A. N. Whitehead). "The approach of logical understanding is

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<sup>16</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Istina i metod: Osnovy filosofskoy germenevtiki* (Moskva: Progress, 1988).

characterized by the fact that they start with individual details and move on to the construction of a holistic structure"<sup>17</sup>. A. N. Whitehead's approach is about the teleological perspective of the whole, which is achieved by induction. Whitehead contrasts "logical understanding" with the "logical pleasure" that the analyst receives in the transition from the plural to the single. Then, in the process of studying the details, the analyst approaches some abstract unity, where the apogee of pleasure is the discovery of the "unity of construction", on the content and scope of which depends the type of civilization. "Logical understanding" as Whitehead's theoretical and philosophical proposal is an attempt to balance the meanings of the two main modes of cognition, concrete and abstract thinking, empirical science and philosophy, which have survived the historical stage of conflict, confrontation, and modern science seek interdisciplinary interaction.

## 7. THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL COGNITION OF G. SHPET

At the beginning of the XX century, the logic of historical cognition was developed by Gustav Shpet<sup>18</sup>, who was a student and follower of E. Husserl. The history of hermeneutics was presented by Shpet as *the history of hermeneutic logic and sign theory*. Like his contemporaries F. Ast, G. Mish, and G. Lipps, Gustav Shpet posed the question of creating a special hermeneutic logic that would solve problems of "expression and meaning." The task of hermeneutic logic is to reform the traditional logic of scientific research and, if necessary, to become the logic of the humanities on the basis of developing the logic of historical interpretation. We see how... the problem of "expression and meaning" that Shpet explored in Husserl's "Logical Studies" is discussed as a boundary phenomenon between hermeneutics, semiotics, and logic: hermeneutics as a theory of understanding becomes dependent on sign theory, but the latter must spread. to logic, that is, it must "see in signs not only an object but also a concept"... Where logic has lost sight of

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<sup>17</sup> Alfred Nort Uaythed, «Istoki sovremennoy nauki», «Filosofiya i sotsiologiya nauki i tehniki. Ezhegodnik 1988.

<sup>18</sup> Gustav Shpet, *Istoriya kak problema logiki. Kriticheskie i metodologicheskie issledovaniya. Chast I. Materialyi.* (Moskva: Tip. A. I. Mamontova, 1916).

the problem of meaning, there it has lost touch with hermeneutics"<sup>19</sup>. G. Shpet's teaching was based on Hegel's dialectical logic and W. Humboldt's logical-linguistic concept. And the Husserl school from which Gustav Shpet graduated united his interests around problems of meaning and significance. The main logical problem for Shpet is the problem of understanding, which becomes crucial for him in solving the logic of the humanities. Hegel's dialectical logic in this context became the theoretical basis for the formation of the concept of "*hermeneutic dialectics*" of Shpet. According to Shpet, the solution of the problems of hermeneutics "should lead to a radical revision of the problems of logic and to a new coverage of the whole philosophy"<sup>20</sup>. Hermeneutic logic should focus on linguistic consciousness, in particular, "verbal consciousness", which opens the prospect of studying the logic of acts of speech. In a broader sense, this "verbal consciousness" is a "cultural consciousness", which also opens the prospect of logical and hermeneutic research in the philosophy of language.

G. Shpet also argued that the research of F. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey need logical support and the main difference between hermeneutic logic should be the change of its subject by its *ontologization*. In this case, special importance should be given to the *logic of the hermeneutic circle*, which distinguishes hermeneutic analysis from the linearity of the traditional logic of scientific analysis. In the work "Hermeneutics and its problems"<sup>21</sup> Shpet outlines a program of such a logical study, and in the work "History as a subject of logic"<sup>22</sup> this idea finds its further development.

Shpet pays attention not so much to the individual as to the social history, which he calls

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<sup>19</sup> Fritef Rodi, «Germenevticheskaya logika v fenomenologicheskoy perspektive: <...> G. Shpet», «Logos. Filosofsko-literaturnyy zhurnal» 7 (1996). 43.

<sup>20</sup> Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, «Germenevtika i eYo problemyi», «Kontekst – 1989. Literaturno-teoreticheskie issledovaniya» (1989). 232.

<sup>21</sup> Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, «Germenevtika i eYo problemyi», «Kontekst - 1989. Literaturno-teoreticheskie issledovaniya» (1989). 231-268; Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, «Germenevtika i eYo problemyi», «Kontekst - 90. Literaturno-teoreticheskie issledovaniya» (1990). 219-259.

<sup>22</sup> Gustav Shpet, *Istoriya kak problema logiki. Kriticheskie i metodologicheskie issledovaniya. Chast I. Materialyi.* (Moskva: Tip. A. I. Mamontova, 1916).

"collective" and "cathedral." According to Shpet, the facts of collective, cathedral experience as facts of social order are as valid as the facts of individual experience of experiences. At the same time, he interprets society as an organism rather than a mechanism or an abstract mathematical number. For example, a union of two people is not just a sum equal to two, but is a social group as a whole. Societies are created through mutual understanding and require a hermeneutic analysis of social problems of understanding. At the heart of the philosophy of history is Hegel's principle of free independent movement of the spirit, so it is the spirit (as a whole) is the bearer of social and historical meaning.

On these grounds, Shpet believes that history as a science has a philosophical dimension when it explores patterns, not just individual facts. In turn, the presence of regularities allows us to assert the idea of historical unity, the objectivity of the historical process, to carry out its forecasting. Hence the logic of historical cognition, which indicates the rationalization of the historical subject. At the same time, Shpet opposes historical universalism, due to which history, instead of the possible, acquires the character of the proper. Shpet defends the idea of the immanent meaning of a historical object. "Modern logic, they say, is the logic of the abstract, and history is concrete, logic in general is powerless before the concrete, and hence before history"<sup>23</sup>. Shpet also separates the logic of historical science from G. Rickert's value concept of the logic of historiography. Shpet appeals to the objective foundations of history and believes that the philosophy of history has its own logic. After all, "the logic of historical science is the science of *the form of expression of historical science*"<sup>24</sup>.

Based on this understanding of the philosophical foundations of the logic of historical cognition, Shpet turns to the hermeneutic tradition of substantiation of the logic of history, which

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<sup>23</sup> Gustav Shpet, *Istoriya kak problema logiki. Kriticheskie i metodologicheskie issledovaniya*. Chast I. Materialyi. (Moskva: Tip. A. I. Mamontova, 1916), 45.

<sup>24</sup> Gustav Shpet, *Istoriya kak problema logiki. Kriticheskie i metodologicheskie issledovaniya*. Chast I. Materialyi. (Moskva: Tip. A. I. Mamontova, 1916), 62.



contains a special relationship to the individual volume. It is related to the form of expression (historical document), which is actually the subject of history. The historical object is formed thanks to *testimony* of witnesses. Testimony is a sign to be interpreted. In turn, interpretation can affect the perception of other signs, it is a means of understanding.

The source of historical cognition is the *word* that serves as a sign. The word in this aspect is considered as *a social thing* that acquires ontological meaning due to the objective form and logical - in the process of formation of the internal form of the word (O. Potebnya). Hermeneutic logic in this aspect explores the ideally possible forms of expression of reality in the word, or the ideally possible relationship of the word to the subject content. It is a non-classical science of ways and methods of scientific presentation. And this logic and scientific presentation must be humanitarian and social in contrast to natural science. One of the key concepts is the concept of "witness authority", which means trust in the witness and implies the probable nature of knowledge.

G. Shpet argues that *the basic logic of the empirical sciences is the logic of history*. Under the single means a historical event. The chain of events becomes history. History appears as a change in time due to the manifestation of human will, which, in turn, has a moral essence. Events are some moral things as objects of history. They express changes in the moral essence that takes shape. History also consists of actions that are reflected in historical messages. The contexts of actions and events are circumstances that can be both simple (ordinary) and extraordinary. Demonstrative conclusions cannot be drawn in historical cognition. This is due to the fragmentary nature of the information on the basis of which conclusions are drawn about the whole.

In modern philosophy, hermeneutics is mainly associated with the continental European tradition. But it is joined by representatives of Anglo-American philosophy. In particular, Richard Rorty and the philosophers of the so-called "Pittsburgh school" Robert Brandom and John McDowell, who linked the logical conclusion in semantics with hermeneutics. Richard Bernstein

emphasized the existence of rationality outside of objectivism, and so on. Hermeneutic logic appears as a tool of normative interpretation, for which standards are developed in the study of Christine Gjesdal (Gjesdal). Rudolf McCrell developed an original concept of judgments and norms in hermeneutics<sup>25</sup>.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS

Hermeneutic logic is saturated with the ideas of dialectics, due to which interpretive models of understanding are formed. Understanding as a cognitive act of the second order also contains elements of evaluation taking into account time and operates with the apparatus of non-classical logic (in particular, the logic of evaluation and temporal logic). This is confirmed by the nonclassical nature of the hermeneutic ontology (see the works of M. Heidegger). Modeling of logical-hermeneutic systems is carried out with the help of semiotics, and the possibility of establishing logical meaning is provided by involving the logic of possible worlds, which coordinates the meaning of text and contexts, text and hypertext, etc. The specificity of understanding linguistic expressions - in eliminating the distance between meaning and imagination.

The study of the history of hermeneutic logic leads to conclusions that confirm Dilthey's distinction between the sciences of nature and the sciences of spirit. The fundamental difference arises at the moment of the inclusion of historical consciousness, which comprehends ontological contexts, factuality and uses texts. The extension of the logic of historical cognition to all empirical sciences is carried out on the basis of structural modifications of the empirical set with the relationship of part and whole. This relation appears as an algorithm for the typology of judgments and conclusions of historical induction. In the teleological sphere, translational conclusions also remain a priority.

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<sup>25</sup> Rudolf Makkreel, *Orientation and Judgment in Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015).

Due to the finding of logical regularities in empirical classes on the basis of historical cognition in the history of hermeneutics, hermeneutic logic was formed, which became an important tool of the logic of the humanities.

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