

# NOTAS HISTÓRICAS Y GEOGRÁFICAS

## **Artículos**

**HERMENEUTIC LOGIC OF HISTORY  
ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES OF SEMANTIC REALITY**

**LÓGICA HERMENÉUTICA DE LA HISTORIA  
SOBRE LAS OPORTUNIDADES DE LA REALIDAD SEMÁNTICA**

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### Abstract

The hermeneutic logic of history, on the one part, resolves the essential gnosiological controversies, and on the other, it considers purely technical issues of history understanding. This research is based on the non-classical approach to the understanding of history from the perspective of hermeneutic logic. Since the scientific positivist interpretation methodology is regarded as irrelevant, a new original technology of the dynamic history interpretation is offered. It converts history into an open "space of free access". The dynamic textual model of history reproduction, which is based on the metonymic comparison of citations, sources and semantic paradoxes, serves as a way of establishing a special trans-communicative historic content. Despite a special ontological status of history as non-existent reality, historic events and phenomena undergo the dynamics of change in the presentation, substantive, virtual ad semantic aspects of its existence.

**Keywords:** Proposition logic, Gesture of history, Dynamic interpretation, Historical narrative.

### Resumen

La lógica hermenéutica de la historia, por una parte, resuelve las controversias gnosiológicas esenciales y, por otra, considera cuestiones puramente técnicas de la comprensión de la historia. Esta investigación se basa en un enfoque no clásico de la comprensión de la historia desde la perspectiva de la lógica hermenéutica. Dado que la metodología de la interpretación científica positivista se considera irrelevante, se ofrece una nueva tecnología original de la interpretación dinámica de la historia. Convierte la historia en un "espacio de libre acceso" abierto. El modelo textual dinámico de reproducción de la historia, que se basa en la comparación metonímica de citas, fuentes y paradojas semánticas, sirve como una forma de establecer un contenido histórico transcomunicativo especial. A pesar de un estatus ontológico especial de la historia como realidad inexistente, los hechos y fenómenos históricos sufren la dinámica del cambio en la presentación, los aspectos sustantivos, virtuales y semánticos de su existencia.

**Palabras Clave:** Proposición lógica, Gesto de la historia, Interpretación dinámica, Narrativa histórica.

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## 1. INTRODUCCIÓN

The hermeneutic logic of history considers history interpretation methods not as a way to establish “reliable knowledge” of history, but as an opportunity of its momentary subjective understanding. The work on the history methodology implies the analysis of such concepts as “history learning”, “history understanding”, “historical research” and “historical narrative”, whose logic varies.

All the traditional methods of learning history, its cognition, in particular, such as comparative-historical and historical-genetic methods, structural-functional analysis, system analysis, synchronic and diachronic analysis, analogy, typology, retrospection and simulation, as well as the biographical method and others are based on the principle of historicism (the research of an event according to the following scheme: pre-requisites – phenomenon / event – effects – forecasts). The overall trend of the historicist methodology is in stating historic *facts*, establishing the degree of sources “reliability”, the “truth” of the news and, finally, the identification of the “objective” evidential truth<sup>1</sup>. Our non-traditional refusal from the historiographic critics (in the meaning of a *text about a text*), principle of historicism, the statement of facts and, generally, the “objective historic truth” indicates an attempt to avoid the classical scientific historical research methodology. Philosophy trusts only source study methods in this methodology, since they refer to the external critics of the source aiming at establishing its authenticity (in terms of the origin and reference). However, shifting away from historical critics, originating from the literary critics, does not yet mean liberation of the historical methodology from the linguistic influence, in this case represented in the commonality of textological and semantic principles. The logic of building a historical text and operational manipulations with it leads the interpreter to the active dialogic understanding. Consequently, the problem of history understanding is solved by improving the methods of expressing historical reality, which again emphasizes the meaning of hermeneutic logic.

All linguistic and semantic metamorphoses that will be in the focus of attention are important for the logic of historical narration since they perfectly demonstrate the techniques of rejecting constant meanings, myths and stereotypes, and provide a real opportunity of arbitrary open reasoning. The key to this revolution in the procedure of understanding is in the migration of phrases, a new function of the name and also what was defined as meta-semiosis by V. A. Podoroga – the motion of signs with no rules<sup>2</sup>. The form, the name and the title of an event are disqualified due to the lack of need to affirm and state anything. The increasing relevance belongs to the indicative *gesture*, which names and immediately denies the named object, while preserving its positivity, since the gesture is always positive (it is its internal property), even in denying evident presence. Thus, the dynamics of verbal signs and images establishes an absolutely new technique of historical narrative that now aims at the liberation of meanings from the *cage* of their wrenching likeness.

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<sup>1</sup> Pronshtein, Questions of theory and methods of historical research. (Moscow: Vysshaja shkola, 1986), 207.

<sup>2</sup> Podoroga, “Mimesis”, New Encyclopedia of Philosophy: in 4 volumes, RAS. Institute of Philosophy, Volume 1. (Moscow: Mysl', 2000), 571-573.

The simulative logic of independent expression, setting concepts, points to another, non-Dilthey, non-classical hermeneutical logic of history, requiring fundamentally different practices for its implementation.

A significant aspect of the history logic is understanding the specific interrelations of temporality. History could not be understood if there was no progress in temporality studies, related to the confrontation between the time of the event, narration and text reception. This technique is currently applicable in the reconstruction of semiotic and non-semiotic history samples, in the semantic logic of arbitrary thoughts, conveying the logic of probable meanings.

Regularities and principles of historical interpretation, the problem of history understanding were initially considered in the hermeneutic logic of the first half of the XVIII century, when the history learning itself was defined as the cognition of *individual things*. Once, in the early XX century, G. G. Shpet<sup>3</sup> and N. I. Kareev<sup>4</sup> found that these problems are closely related to semiotics as via sign structuring semiotics opens the way to structuring concepts.

An area of contemporary history logic is the logic of historical expressions and the deconstruction of historical texts, which represent the very process of interpretation as a game, based on a special logic of *the carnival world* (“the world inside out”). The logic of historical expressions and the deconstruction of historical texts are clearly seen in the textological operations of *pre-devising* the narrative to create intertextual semantic structures based on the experience of Western post-structuralists: U. Eco<sup>5</sup>, W. B. Benjamin<sup>6</sup>, J. Derrida<sup>7</sup>, M. Foucault<sup>8</sup>, M. Blanchot<sup>9</sup>, and G. Deleuze<sup>10</sup>. Language games and fact-based history paradoxes are manifested via addressing the original concept suggested by E. A. Sidorenko<sup>11</sup> in the field of logical semantics of hypothetical worlds. Therewith, classical history ontology by K. T. Jaspers<sup>12</sup>, M. Heidegger<sup>13</sup>, seeking universalization of the unified history experience is blocked for the virtual freedom of the interpreter and multiple individual intimate stories. In virtually unlimited potential opportunities, the interpreter reflects on his/her own transgression in his/her historical *under-existence*.

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<sup>3</sup> Shpet, History as a Problem of Logic: Critical and Methodological Research Part 1: Materials (Moscow: Printing house A. I. Mamontov, 1916.), 476.; Shpet, The inner form of the word: Studies and variations on themes of Humboldt (Moscow: Typography "Internacional", 1927), 219.

<sup>4</sup> Kareev, History: Theory of historical knowledge. (Petrograd: Printing house of M. M. Stasyulevich, 1916), 281.

<sup>5</sup> Eco, Missing Structure: An Introduction to Semiology. (St. Petersburg: Petropolis, 1998), 430.

<sup>6</sup> Benjamin, “On the Understanding of History”, New literary review, num 46 (2000), 81-90.

<sup>7</sup> Derrida, Writing and distinction. (St. Petersburg: Akademicheskii' proekt, 2000), 432.

<sup>8</sup> Foucault, This is not a pipe. (Moscow: Hudozhestvennyi' zhurnal, 1998), 5-83.

<sup>9</sup> Blanchot, “Experience is the limit”, Thanatography of Eros: Georges Bataille and French Thought of the Mid-20th Century (St. Petersburg: Mifril, 1994), 63-79.

<sup>10</sup> Deleuze, The logic of meaning. (Moscow: "Raritet"; Yekaterinburg: "Delovaja kniga", 1998), 325.; Deleuze, G., “Plato and the simulacrum”, Intentionality and Textuality: Philos. thought of France of the twentieth century. (Tomsk: Vodolei', 1998), 225-241.; Deleuze, G., Difference and Repetition (St. Petersburg: Petropolis, 1998), 384.

<sup>11</sup> Sidorenko, Logic. Paradoxes. Possible worlds. (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2002), 312.

<sup>12</sup> Jaspers, The meaning and purpose of history. (Moscow: Respublika, 1994), 527.

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, Time and Being. (Moscow: Respublika, 1993), 447.

The aim of the research is to show the meaning of textology and structural techniques of the logic of utterances for the development of the non-classical history logic, which can free a historian from the cultural ideological determination in his/her history understanding and description, from mythologization of the lost reality in the modern political context. The study attempts to develop the logical aspect of history philosophical interpretation, in particular, by focusing on the logic of historical time. The possibilities of its reset (or restarting) are revealed via the use of the historical narrative semantic logic techniques.

## 2. THE GENESIS OF THE LOGIC OF UTTERANCES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE METHODOLOGY OF HISTORY

This study primarily focuses on the text, its meanings, and the ways of expressing historic meanings, it is worth referring directly to the logic of utterances in its pre-hermeneutic Aristotle tradition<sup>14</sup>. Limiting the essence of a thing to its design principle (to the form), the concept – to the name, and understanding – to the language grammatical structure, Aristotle regarded linguistic structures as the reflections of thinking, without giving the language (text) an independent meaning-making function. In speech, he differentiated “narration” and “utterance”. “Narration” is a kind of pronouncing with no clear content. It is neutral for understanding, because it is not strictly outlined logically and grammatically, the meaning of the “narrative” is not ensured. Therefore, in this case understanding is the process that is not carried out within the language domain, but beyond it, beyond the “narration”. The “utterance”, vice versa, is grammatically and logically structured and harmonized. Thus, according to Aristotle, it is understandable, guarantees meaning and it allows into its environment by itself.

The above shows the priority of the common over individual, whole over a part, necessary over accidental and likeness over similarity. The principle of probability is not applicable in the modal logic of utterances. The forms of expressing the truth under Aristotle do not yet correlate with the principle of perception and individual experience. While Aristotle valued utterances for their logical coherence, co-dependency, contemporary hermeneutic logic prioritizes narration – for its logical neutrality. The generation of meaning is implied not via the impeccability of morphological and semiotic structures, but, on the contrary, due to their destruction and liberation of text fragments from the historical context. The composition, containing the meaning, is replaced with a collage, a calligram, where the meaning can be made. The dramatic shift in the priority change – utterance to narration – would thus show Aristotle’s logic turnover if it were purely hermeneutic.

In the traditional hermeneutic logic of history the problem of interconditionality of history expression, perception and understanding was first developed by J. M. Chladenius (1710-1759). The German theologian provided the critic of historical reason long before the Critique of pure reason by I. Kant, presenting the first experience of the “logic of history sciences”<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, About the interpretation, Works in 4 volumes, Volume 2 (Moscow: Mysl', 1978), 91-116.

<sup>15</sup> Shpet, History as a Problem of Logic: Critical and Methodological Research. Part 1: Materials (Moscow: Printing house A. I. Mamontov, 1916): 257.

J. M. Chladenius attended to the consideration of historic events, the way they are perceived by witnesses, retellers, and, finally, readers of historical texts. He also dwelled on the issue of the material logical processing and systematization for clarification purposes and, he focused on the issue of reliability and probability of historical knowledge<sup>16</sup>. Therewith, the classical historian reasoned as follows: since everything that our reason must comply with while learning the truth refers to logic, the rules of history learning are a part of logic. Modern philosophy is rather about *creation*, than about “learning the truth”. However, this process is to be logical, though the logic here is of a different type. New rationality, inherent in the truth seeking, determines, in turn, new rules of history understanding, referring more to the logic of probability than to the logic of reliability.

J. M. Chladenius noted that when we need to indicate the validity of a thing that lasts in time, we say that it exists, while when we need to indicate that things fully or partially transitive, we say that they occur, happen (“for example that the sun is and a battle happens”)<sup>17</sup>. Consequently, J. M. Chladenius concluded that learning history is actually the cognition of what happens, the cognition of things that exist, or, to be more exact, individual things. This is the empirical nature of history as a science. While studying the specifics of the historical object, he realized that the historical interpretation applies induction, which is still based on the relation between a part and the whole, and not the genus and species.

In this case, the transition from individual to common occurs through landmark (historically significant) events along with ignoring a variety of individual circumstances. Empirical judgments as a result of the empirical experience are based on the perception of individual cases. However, they are given *general historical* significance. They are *samples* and thus are a kind of general judgments. The creation of empirical, heterogeneous sets, unlike mathematical, homogeneous ones, occurs via establishing imaginary connections between their elements. These connections are enabled by individuals, who build the elements of the empirical sets in certain proportions, forming a special space of the historical text. For instance, in logic, historical knowledge *samples* are representatives of an uncertain set. Furthermore, the imaginary nature of connections between individual elements of an uncertain set determines the probability of the conclusion that implies exceptions<sup>18</sup>.

In Russian philosophy, G. G. Shpet raised the issue of creating hermeneutic логики, which had to reform traditional scientific research logic and become humanitarian logic based on the development of the history interpretation logic<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Shpet, History as a Problem of Logic: Critical and Methodological Research. Part 1: Materials (Moscow: Printing house A. I. Mamontov, 1916): 258.

<sup>17</sup> Shpet, History as a Problem of Logic: Critical and Methodological Research. Part 1: Materials (Moscow: Printing house A. I. Mamontov, 1916): 266.

<sup>18</sup> Yurkevich, “Logical aspects of legal hermeneutics”, Bulletin of the Yaroslav the Wise National Law University. Series: Philosophy, philosophy of law, sociology, political science, num 3(42) (2019), 34-44.

<sup>19</sup> Shpet, The inner form of the word: Studies and variations on themes of Humboldt (Moscow: Typography "Internacional", 1927), 219.

Hermeneutics as the theory of understanding appeared to be dependent on semiotics. Nonetheless, the latter expanded to logic: “to see in signs not only an object, but also a concept”. That was logic attempted to renew the connection with hermeneutics. However, the problem of the “individual and experience” has an absolutely different solution in the modern hermeneutic logic of history: this solution may not be found by the *historical induction*, the principle of holism, the meaning of the *historical truth* and a *fake*, the concept of the *collective subject* (J. M. Chladenius) is not used, while it shows the typology of the set elements. Thus, it is impossible to extrapolate individual from common things. The individual loses its universal status and gains self-sufficient exclusivity. Accordingly, the logic of history understanding in postmodernity has lost the relevance of the preceding conclusions, but not the relevance of the problem concept.

As early as in the early XX century, N. I. Kareev believed that a precondition for scientific work and for any cognitive activity was a *story*, meaning the establishment of certain narrative rules and their rationale, regardless of the stage of the cognition process when they emerge<sup>20</sup>. Normally, that happened during the hypothetical forecast, ensuring the so-called retrospective interpretation, suggesting the projection of the story end to its beginning. Nevertheless, postmodernity allowed the rational narration rules to be also expressed while setting the algorithm of the “accidental orientation” of the researcher in the chaos of facts, which, in turn, ensures unforeseen single subjective story interpretation. Modern logic of historical research tends rather to the rationality of the second type, which does not set the rules of the historical intrigue, but only provokes its endless variations owing to the application of rational methods.

While studying certain phenomena of the reality, researchers may set them in artificial conditions, designed to get answers to the urgent questions. It is an experimental method – the method of predominantly natural sciences. The experience, gained as a result of the technical experiment with history, has a rather relative practical value, and the forecasts based on it, will be of stochastic nature. “It goes without saying”, said N. I. Kareev at the beginning of the last century, “that the experimental method is not applicable to history. History is the thing of the past, and no experiments are possible with what does not exist any longer”<sup>21</sup>. Still, the dynamics, achievable owing to the contemporary interpretation technologies, creates the field for the historical experiments not in the past reality but in the text–narrative structures. The development of data storage and reproduction technologies enables the experimental method to be implemented within the interpretation methodology<sup>22</sup>.

It is also connected with the fact that it is not forecasting that is crucial in historical hermeneutic practice, but the identification of individual with global historical experience. Classical philosophy of history considered that due to the impossibility of experimenting with history, we have to settle for mere observations of the studied objects and phenomena, when the latter are given in their natural conditions (at present), or in reliably reconstructed (in the past).

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<sup>20</sup> Kareev, *History: Theory of historical knowledge* (Petrograd: Printing house of M. M. Stasyulevich, 1916), 281.

<sup>21</sup> Kareev, *History: Theory of historical knowledge* (Petrograd: Printing house of M. M. Stasyulevich, 1916): 38.

<sup>22</sup> Lyotard, *The State of Postmodernity* (2009). Available from: <https://gtmarket.ru/library/basis/3097>.

Contemporary techniques make it possible to observe historic events in the pure *laboratory conditions*, when they appear to be given in their natural (also called authentic) form at present, having occurred in the past, which may be called *examination* of the missing fact. The specific feature of history is still vital, since it deals with something that does not exist any longer, but it becomes blurred that this *no-longer existent* is not subject to *observation*. All these require support on the new, non-conventional logic of history, where the development and grounds of its principles are truly relevant today.

### 3. UNDERSTANDING HISTORY IN POSTMODERNISM: POSSIBILITIES OF LOGICAL SEMANTICS AND HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

Language (primarily as a text) is a specific and the only possible historical “location” (what has happened) and, still, the space of developing multiple truths (understanding of what has happened). In postmodernism, the very correlation between historical facts and the “existence of objects in a language” are the only thing leading to the true way of understanding historical events, and it is still significant. Modern anti-structuralist approach to the methods of history expression and interpretation radically changes its outer form, internal logic as well as the text function, making it resemble a fragmentarily flashing, chaotic, restored memory of the bygone reality.

Russian philosopher E. A. Sidorenko focuses on logical semantics of possible realities and allows for the expediency of searching for historical truth in counterfactual space, created by clauses of unreal condition. At the same time, the concept developed by him does not go beyond the modal logic of statements. The world we are dealing with at the moment, the worlds that were in the past, as well as those that will be in the future – all of them belong to the multitude of “possible worlds”. However, it does not refer to them only. The path that our world has passed in its historical development is itself only one of the “possibilities”. At every moment of the past, our world had alternative paths of its development; they exist in the present, and will remain in the future.

From a purely logical, formal point of view, as E. A. Sidorenko argues, it does not matter what kind of events occur – important in any respect or not important in any way – two possible worlds are distinguished. Any other world belongs to equally possible worlds. Logic does not deal with events, but with statements about them only. Therefore, for logic, a “possible world” is a set of sentences describing all the facts of an ontologically possible world. This multitude probably consists of a very large, but finite number of urgently formulated atomic sentences and their negations, as it was noted by L. Wittgenstein<sup>23</sup>.

However, any change in the real state of affairs entails an infinite number of consequences, thus following that potentially the number of statements about the world is infinite, like the number of possible worlds.

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<sup>23</sup> Wittgenstein, “Philosophical studies”, New in foreign linguistics, Issue 16: Foreign Pragmatics (Moscow: Progress, 1985), 79-128.

Based on our striving for the most adequate understanding of an event and a kind of “truth” (or sufficient convincingness) of judgments about it, it is advisable to take into account the influence not only of the empirical factor on the final result, but also of admissible conditional counterfactual statements as “possible worlds”<sup>24</sup>.

Obviously, it is not easy to find the necessary argumentation for both scientific and historical proof. It is not always possible to evaluate the consequences of those decisions and events with which we are dealing with in the present. What is it like to do this by analyzing the past provided incomplete and subjective information about it? They often say that history does not know the subjunctive mood. And this is true when history means those real events that happened in a certain time period. But when the point is about history as a system of knowledge, designed to “display” (as previously thought) or, more precisely, create conditions for the manifestation of certain events, then we cannot do without the subjunctive mood (counterfactual statements), and therefore without constructing other, conjectural paths of development (other possible worlds). It is so, because history in its second meaning (as a system of knowledge) necessarily presupposes many things that make sense only if alternative paths of development are admitted.

An example may be in selecting facts by their importance. It obviously depends on whether the historian believes that certain facts have seriously influenced the course of events that are worth of his/her attention. The historian cannot do without attempts to understand the behavior of historical personalities, and therefore, without assumptions about the conditions under which their actions and deeds could remain unfulfilled, about the result which a different decision of this could have or that subject of history could lead to, and, in general, what would have happened if things had not been the way they had<sup>25</sup>. History is also hardly possible without specific assessments of the activities of individuals, classes, organizations, states etc. For example, any assessment, in addition to the fact that it is subjective, presupposes a comparison of what was with what could have been provided other actions of the evaluated subjects, which means a mental, theoretical assumption of a different result than it was in reality. This assumption is presented in attempts to express this hypothetical result as a missed opportunity.

Attention should be paid to one factor that is not always taken into account: the assessment of past events, actions, decisions in many respects (if not in everything) depends on what results they ultimately led to. Naturally, as a rule, the objective status quo is considered as such a result, and when the latter is considered unsatisfactory, the solution under the assessment is characterized accordingly. Therewith, it may be overlooked that the connection of such a decision with the subsequent state of affairs, as a rule, is mediated by many other actions, decisions and incidents. It is also quite likely that if they were different, the solution that they are trying to assess would also look quite different, too. Thus, the assessment is dependent on which of the possible worlds turned out to be realized<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Sidorenko, Logic. Paradoxes. Possible worlds (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2002): 254.

<sup>25</sup> Gusev, The meaning of the possible. Connotational semantics (St. Petersburg: Aletei'ja, 2002), 382.

<sup>26</sup> Sidorenko, Logic. Paradoxes. Possible worlds (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2002): 283-284.

It is believed that there is a single ontological world, with its unique history and unrealized future. In this world, the subject of cognition, the cognizer, being an element of this world, carries out his/her cognitive activity. The awareness of the imaginary unity with the ontological world in which one lives, helps them to carry out the study of history not in a detached way, but to perform the so-called “included observation” in a natural situation by using their integrative ability. Still, the speculative world of human internal images, created with the participation of the imagination and under the influence of parallel counterfactual series, does not indicate the interpreter's ontological identification with the world of reality at different times (past or future) – their other being, but it rather testifies to the virtual lack of being of the interpreter, their unsafe approaching to a possible world, giving a rise to the risk of contact with the genuine.

The “genuine” is understood not as some reanimated materiality or existence, but as a history “fertilized” in the individual consciousness of the subject, the only one of the many possible stories that does not necessarily coincide with the one that occurred in reality, but belongs to counterfactuality – the world of the impossible. The genuine, therefore, acts as a kind of energy trigger that affects the cognizing subject and is perceived by them as a potential possibility or the very principle of the existence of history, in other words, a spirit that does not find its “objectification” in objective forms of knowledge, such as historical criticism, as was the case with the Absolute Spirit in G. Hegel, since the new authenticity reveals the possibility of its unique manifestation only in subjective forms of consciousness.

The main requirements that were traditionally applied to the subject of knowledge were that they should be able to construct statements about the ontological world, as well as evaluate the latter as true or false. It used to be believed that the cognizing subject calls those statements true that are, for some reason, referred to those “correctly” describing the properties and relationships of objects of the ontological world, and, accordingly, calls those ones false, the negation of which are considered true. Currently, the phenomenological approach naturally eliminates the objective criteria for the truth and falsity of historical judgments. Possible worlds as models of cognition allow comparing subjective meanings and their correlation.

E. A. Sidorenko tends to believe that we are forced to choose a new understanding of truth that corresponds to these models, because its interpretation as an utterance that “responds” (by similarity) to the ontological world loses its meaning<sup>27</sup>. Any cognizer claims such correspondence. The verification of statements becomes possible only in possible worlds. Further, the latter reflect only what the cognizer him/herself considers to be true (acceptable, convincing). In this regard, P. Ricoeur comes to the conclusion that if the experienced past had been then available to us, it would not now have become an object of knowledge: for when this past was present, it was, like our present, confusing, diverse, and incomprehensible<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> Sidorenko, Logic. Paradoxes. Possible worlds (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2002): 279.

<sup>28</sup> Ricoeur, Time and story: in 4 parts. Part 1: Intrigue and Historical Story (Moscow; St. Petersburg: Universitetskaja kniga, 1998): 117.

The logical problem of similarity, to which the technique of representing the past is closely related, was attended by G. Deleuze in his work *Plato and the Simulacrum*<sup>29</sup>. A copy is a conceptual formation, since it is based on a model that sets the factor of likeness, while a simulacrum, according to G. Deleuze, is based on inconsistency and difference, it contains a lack of likeness, but “if we nevertheless assume that a simulacrum has a model, then it will be a model of a different kind, a model of the Other, from which simulacra arise, containing the absence of likeness”<sup>30</sup>. The efforts of postmodern philosophy are aimed at the search for this kind of a model that reveals the concept not in the expression of some objective idea which is alike (events and phenomena that took place in reality), but in the independent production of a new, “mimicking” idea.

In a good copy, according to G. Deleuze, there is always a productive operation and the corresponding, if not knowledge, then, at least, the ‘correct opinion’, while imitation is doomed to a derogatory meaning, because it is ‘just a simulation’. It refers to a simulacrum and denotes only the external and, allegedly, not at all productive result of the similarity. This result is obtained through cunning, subterfuge, or subversion of ideals and idols. The ‘correct’ opinion disappears, and only a special type of ironic confrontation remains. The power captures the ‘art of collision’ that transcends knowledge and opinion<sup>31</sup>. Thus, the mastery of the technique of simulative imitation allows the interpreter to get rid of the prerogative of the ‘correct’ viewpoint, which already has a positive effect in terms of understanding, allegorically explained once by Don-Aminado: “Nothing hinders seeing as a point of view”.

According to G. Deleuze, there are two different ways of interpreting the world. One encourages us to think of difference in terms of prior likeness or identity, while the other encourages us to think of similarity or even identity as a product of profound incomparability or inconsistency. The first interpretation already initially defines the world as an image, the world of copies or representations – a paradoxical world of historical falsifications. The second interpretation, in contrast to the first, defines the world of the simulacrum as the world of virtual reality, indirectly (through copies of copies) correlated with historical reality. This interpretation establishes the world itself as a fantasy, and it is the application of this interpretation that is justified in relation to history. Identity undoubtedly arises, but it arises as a law that confuses and complicates all the series and ensures the return of each of them in the course of the accelerated movement of the represented citations. In this interpretation, simulation is inseparable from the eternal return that turns images over or subverts the established world of stereotypical representation. Thus, the paradoxical form of history is the only possible form of its interpretation. Nostalgia for history translates into a formal diachronic quotation of the past – pure formatting, instead of copying.

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<sup>29</sup> Deleuze, “Plato and the simulacrum”, *Intentionality and Textuality: Philos. thought of France of the twentieth century* (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1998), 225-241.

<sup>30</sup> Deleuze, “Plato and the simulacrum”, *Intentionality and Textuality: Philos. thought of France of the twentieth century* (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1998): 226.

<sup>31</sup> Deleuze, “Plato and the simulacrum”, *Intentionality and Textuality: Philos. thought of France of the twentieth century* (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1998): 226.

According to M. Foucault, it was the Belgian surrealist artist R. Magritte who, in his paintings and calligrams, successfully separated the likeness from the similarity and made the latter play against the first, proceeding from the fact that the image of an object is not the object itself<sup>32</sup>. Likeness has a “master”: the original element, in relation to which the order and hierarchy of those more and more distant copies that can be made of it are built. Similarity presupposes some primordial reference that prescribes and classifies. According to this scheme, a classical story was written, claiming to be similar to the events of the lost reality that it described.

Similarity unfolds in series that have no beginning or end, these series can be run in one direction or another, they are isotropic, not subject to any hierarchy, but spread through a sequence of small differences. The principle of similarity forms the basis of modern methods of presenting history. Likeness is subject to representation; the similarity serves as a pervasive repetition of it. The likeness is set by the model, which it should be a conductor of and which it should make recognizable; similarity introduces a simulacrum as a reversible link from one to a similar other. As M. Foucault writes, “The simulacrum slides over the surface, and the direction of its movement is always reversible”<sup>33</sup>. Simulative similarity is free of directives and democratically equivalent.

The likeness presupposes a single, linear, and always the same statement: this one, that one, over there – this is the thing. Similarity multiplies all sorts of statements, they seem to perform a dance together, lean and fall on each other, moving along a rhizomatic trajectory. At the same time, it is important that likeness is not at all an integral part of things. It belongs exclusively to thought, as R. Magritte himself argued<sup>34</sup>. Thought is endowed with likeness to what it sees, hears or knows, “it becomes what the world gives it,” which resembles the phenomenon of consciousness. Consequently, the property of likeness is inherent only in thought, while the property of similarity is inherent in images, signs (forms of expression). The text, no doubt, is at the same point of division, on one side of the borderline there remains a thought trying to exist in a mode of likeness, and on the other – things connected by a relation of similarity. Therefore, with his painting “This is not a pipe” (better known as “The Treachery of Images”, 1929) R. Magritte only tried to destroy the likeness between the drawing and the real thing, and then – the signed text and the drawing. However, the title of the picture only seems to be a negation, for it is about the fact that together with the likeness, the statement of reality is also rejected. Yet, in its essence, the title is an affirmative statement: the statement of a simulacrum, the statement of an element of a series of similarities. The same happens when the reliability of historical lists is denied, which does not at all reject the need for their presence, but only asserts their serial importance as a simulacrum – the only possible reality of history. And yet, historical science strives for “true” knowledge based on critical thinking, causal and finalist conditioned chains of relationships<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Foucault, This is not a pipe (Moscow: Hudozhestvennyi' zhurnal, 1998), 5-83.

<sup>33</sup> Foucault, This is not a pipe (Moscow: Hudozhestvennyi' zhurnal, 1998): 58.

<sup>34</sup> Foucault, This is not a pipe (Moscow: Hudozhestvennyi' zhurnal, 1998): 62.

<sup>35</sup> Arbelaez-Campillo, Tatsiy, Rojas-Bogamon, Danilyan, “The importance of critical thinking in modern society”, Bulletin of the Yaroslav the Wise National Law University. Series: philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology, num 3(46) (2020), 11-27.

Foucault-type likeness underlies the dialectical principle of historicism, objectivism and scientific-historical rational methodology. This is the main error of historical science, noted by modern philosophy. In order to make the past cognizable, it is necessary to bring it qualitatively closer to the present, giving it the same properties of disorder, unpredictability, incomprehensibility, probability, which the hermeneutical logic of postmodernism worked at.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Thus, a shift in the cultural paradigm and a different understanding of the course of the historical process and historical time determine the emergence of a new logic of understanding the events of the past and a different interpretation tactics. This entails a change in the ways of perception and presentation of history and requires the development of a conceptually new historical methodology. The random combinatorics of historical narrative, the dynamism of its form, the liberalism of meaning formation, and alternative subjective ideologies – all this testifies to the “technicalization”, digitalization of historical methods based on synergetic ontology. That way, if the basis of technical sciences, the goal of which is an effective invention, is an experiment with artificial things, constructed like objects of animate and inanimate nature, then the basis of modern historical science is innuendo with the ‘inanimate’, once tendentiously interpreted tradition. History is not only constantly being described, but also rewritten, multiplying simulacra. As a conclusion, we can state the collapse of the old logic of history and the formation of a new one. The discourse of the non-classical logic of history is reduced to the development of a system of techniques for constructing a narrative and its further interpretation. These narrative practices are based not on the principles of scientific and historical hermeneutics, but on the principles of the hermeneutic logic that preceded it, which does not criticize the historical text itself, like literary criticism does, but provides constructive interpretation of the meaning of certain historical events using text deconstruction.

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